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1.  Summary 
This rapid literature review collates lessons from the literature on peace conditionality. This is a 
companion paper to Herbert (2019)1 which looks more specifically at lessons related to aid 
(conditionality) and non-state armed groups (NSAGs). 
While there is literature on peace conditionality more generally – e.g. being used for a range of 
purposes, and at different stages of a peace process and implementation of a peace agreement 
– there is little literature that focusses specifically on using conditions to get, and keep, conflict 
parties at the negotiation table. Where possible, this rapid review attempts to focus on the latter, 
but most of the findings come from articles looking at the broader use of conditionality. This may 
also be complicated by the fact that most aid is conditional (to some degree), and the term and 
understanding of conditionality is not clear, and is often not used in the literature. This all 
complicated the search for literature for this paper, and the criteria for inclusion. 
Peace conditionality was a popular focus of analysis in the 2000s, however, since the late 2000s 
there has been much less published on this issue. In view of this limitation, this query includes 
literature from the 2000s, particularly drawing on the 2008 articles published in Conciliation 
Resources’ Accord. There is a range of academic and policy/practitioner literature on this 
subject. One gap in the literature identified by Sindre (2014) is that despite of aid conditionality 
being used, little is known about how rebel groups respond to it and strategise to further their 
interests.  
External actors use aid conditionality in conflict and peace contexts to try and shape the cost-
benefit calculus of conflict actors by providing or withdrawing benefits upon changes in behaviour 
or policy. The international community began to push for the use of aid conditionality in conflict 
and peacebuilding contexts following several failed humanitarian interventions from the 1990s 
onwards. To some extent, most aid can be considered conditional, however, the term peace 
conditionality tends to refer to stricter forms of conditionality for the recipients of aid – e.g. when 
formal performance criteria and monitoring are set up, and used, to ensure that the aid conditions 
are met.  
Conditionality can be used throughout all stages of the conflict, peace-making, peacebuilding and 
peace process implementation cycle. The aid used in peace conditionality can employ a range of 
incentives - economic, political, and security. And typically employs a mix of persuasion, support, 
and pressure. Conditionality can be explained as forming a spectrum of policy approaches 
alongside incentives and sanctions (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008).  
Lessons  
Coordination/fragmentation of donors and agendas - Conditionality is more likely to be 
effective if it is exercised coherently by donors, yet the fragmented donor landscape and donor 
incentive structures complicate this. Donors are often reluctant to coordinate and cooperate, 
preferring to pursue their own objectives, and preferring not to implement the agreed conditions if 
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they contradict their objectives. When donors do not have a united stance on aid conditionality, 
the strength of conditionality is undermined. 
The conflict parties’ interests, power, and motivational structures - Conditionality is more 
likely to be effective when it designed according to an in-depth understanding of the conflict 
parties, including their incentive structures, the decision-making processes of the leaders, and 
the wider socio-political context. However, donors’ lack of sufficient knowledge about the local 
context is “perhaps the greatest obstacle to the effective use of conditionality” (Manning & 
Malbrough, 2010). Donors cannot create a peace process, they can only support one where the 
key protagonists want one. 
Unintended consequences - The use of peace conditionality is fraught with dilemmas and risks, 
particularly as groups or individuals may feign commitment just to secure benefits, or to meet 
international expectations. External incentives can negatively distort the group and individual 
motivations for peace-making, and can trigger armed groups to fragment. Effective conditionality 
requires donors to have a good understanding of the potential consequences of donor actions 
(intentional and unintentional), and the linkages between peacebuilding and other reform 
agendas (e.g. economic reforms, governance reforms, etc). The use of sanctions can lead to 
particularly adverse unintended consequences, as: they are rarely designed as part of a strategic 
conflict resolution framework; due to their bluntness and inflexibility; and due to perceptions of 
bias and inconsistency  
(In)effectiveness - There are diverse positions within the donor and academic community with 
regard to the desirability, feasibility, and effectiveness of conditionalities. E.g. Sindre (2014) finds 
that peace conditionalities may encourage peace talks, and ceasefires, and can encourage rebel 
strategies that enhance the civilian, non-military aspect of the insurgent organisation, but they 
are “poor tools” in reducing rebel predatory behaviour, and in encouraging peace settlements. 
Barnes, et al. (2008) find that while, in theory, conditionality is thought to be useful in 
encouraging a peace settlement by changing the cost-benefit calculation of conflict and peace, in 
practice, it appears to have been ineffective, and even to have actually done harm in 
exacerbating conflict dynamics. While Boyce (2003) finds that conditionality affects different 
conflict parties in different ways – e.g. it is not very effective in influencing rebel groups that 
cannot directly receive aid, whereas it can be influential when used with governments with high 
aid-dependency.  
Inconsistencies and political motivations with conditionality can exacerbate conflict - 
Peace conditionality in the Occupied Palestine Territories (OPT) has contributed to the breakout 
of conflict, the undermining of the two-state roadmap to peace, and huge reductions in the living 
conditions of the Palestinians (Brynen, 2008). Conditionality in Palestine has been used 
sporadically and inconsistently.  
Ethical considerations - Conditionality poses serious dilemmas related to ethics, neo-
colonialism, and sovereignty – e.g. the morality of withholding aid from communities in need 
during humanitarian and conflict crises.  
2. What is aid and peace conditionality? 
External actors use aid conditionality in conflict and peace contexts to try and shape the 
cost-benefit calculus of conflict actors by providing or withdrawing benefits upon changes 
in behaviour or policy (Boyce, 2002; Griffiths & Barnes, 2008, p.18). Conditionality aims to 
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change the incentive structures of the actors, encouraging the momentum and consolidation of 
peace-making and building (Boyce, 2002; Dahi, 2019) 
The international community began to push for the use of aid conditionality in conflict and 
peacebuilding contexts following several failed humanitarian interventions from the 1990s 
onwards (Boyce, 2002). Typically, peace and conflict studies’ scholars “have contrasted the 
potential positive impact of peace conditionality with the dubious legacy of economic 
conditionality” (Dahi, 2019). Yet the idea of aid conditionality tends to be associated with the 
economic conditionality that multinational institutions and donors have used from the 1980s 
onwards, with their policies of structural adjustment (Dahi, 2019). 
To some extent, most aid can be considered conditional, in that it is usually given alongside 
a purpose and a promise – e.g. to deliver services, to use technical assistance, to improve 
governance, to use in the health sector, to produce a report, etc.  “Whether formal or informal, 
conditionality makes access to assistance contingent on actions by the recipient. Foreign aid 
seldom is a blank check” (Boyce, 2003, p.2). And whether aid is considered conditional, or not, 
can depend on the actor (Goodhand, 2006). 
Frerks (2006, p.17) defines peace conditionality as “the use of aid as a lever to persuade 
conflicting parties to make peace, to implement a proposed peace accord, and to 
consolidate peace”. The term peace conditionality appears to be used in the literature mostly 
when referring to stricter forms of conditionality – when formal performance criteria and 
monitoring are set up, and used, to ensure that the aid conditions are met, with the aim of 
encouraging the implementation of peace, peace agreements and in consolidating peace (Boyce, 
2002). Conditions may be based on process, input, output, and/or outcome indicators 
(Goodhand, 2006; Klimesova, 2015). These forms of conditionality could be considered as “hard” 
forms (Goodhand & Sedra, 2007). In theory, aid may be given or stopped if specified terms, 
agreements. or rules are met/not met (Ehrenfeld, Kogut & Hove, 2003). However, in practice, 
donors often do not follow through and enforce their conditions, thus making the conditionality 
less useful - both in practice, and also in normative power. 
“Conditioning can vary in several dimensions including the degree of local ownership, the 
‘hardness’, specificity and level of the conditions” (Goodhand & Sedra, 2007). Goodhand 
and Sedra (2007) use a broader understanding of conditionality which includes “softer, informal 
forms of conditionality”, so as to be able to analyse the more “subtle (and sometimes invisible) 
forms of disciplining or signalling that take place in the conditionality game”.  
Conditionality can be used throughout all stages of the conflict, peace-making, 
peacebuilding and peace process implementation cycle (Boyce, 2003).2 E.g. “first, prior to 
the outbreak of violent unrest, external actors can mitigate tensions by conditioning the granting 
of external aid on peaceful resolution of the tensions. Second, during peace-making and/or 
peace enforcement, external parties can use conditionality when exhorting parties to cease 
armed operations and embark on a peaceful resolution of the existing tensions. And finally, in the 
peace consolidation stage, conditionality can be employed to encourage parties’ commitment to 
an implementation of the peace agreement” (Klimesova, 2015, p.37). E.g. conditionality was 
used in Sri Lanka to incentive: the conflict parties’ to implement the ceasefire commitments they 
made during the 2003 Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development; the participation 
                                                   
2 Although initially peace conditionality was only referred to in the post-agreement period (Goodhand, 2006).  
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of a Muslim delegation in peace talks; and the promotion and protection of human rights (Smith, 
2008).  
Conditionality has typically been used and viewed as a state-to-state tool, however some 
authors e.g. Goodhand and Sedra (2007) have broadened this to look at state-to-non-state 
actors too. The state-to-state focus is because of the logic of aid conditionality – the more 
dependent a recipient is on the aid, the higher the chance for influence is. Therefore, the biggest 
aid donors – the multilaterals or the bilaterals – have the biggest influence, particularly when their 
aid makes up a bigger percentage of the total aid budget, unless the donors are coordinated. For 
this reason, nongovernment organisations (NGOs) also have less leverage (Chong, 2002). 
NGOs also tend to have less leverage with conditionality as they are less coordinated and as 
they take more responsibility for protecting populations during conflict (Chong, 2002). 
The aid used in peace conditionality can employ a range of incentives - economic (e.g. 
development aid), political (e.g. diplomatic relations, recognition in international/multilateral 
institutions), and security (e.g. protection guarantees) (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008; Haider, 2014). 
The term peace conditionality is typically used to describe the use of economic incentives, rather 
than political or security incentives (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). It can take many forms, e.g. 
capital, resources, institutional and technical assistance, development of justice and security 
systems, etc (Ehrenfeld, Kogut & Hove, 2003). It typically uses a mix of persuasion, support, and 
pressure (Ehrenfeld, Kogut & Hove, 2003). Goodhand and Sedra (2007) conceptualise 
conditionalities as creating a triangular relationship between international actors, domestic elites 
and societal groups, rather than just a bipolar relationship between the international actors and  
domestic elites receiving the aid, as the “(dis)incentives applied by international actors may have 
a critical effect on the capacities and legitimacy of domestic elites and their relationships (and 
bargaining processes) with societal groups”. 
Conditionality can be explained as forming a spectrum of policy approaches alongside 
incentives and sanctions. Figure 1 depicts this spectrum (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). Each 
explanation reflects “a different logic of how change can be achieved and what degree of 
‘leverage’ is required to achieve it” (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008, p.13). The approaches that use 
conditionality are highlighted in blue in Figure 1. Conditionality can be structured in a positive 
way (do x), a negative way (stop doing x), or as a deterrent (don’t start doing x) (Schelling in 
Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). Griffiths and Barnes (2008, p.18) explain the logic of the categories:  
 Force – the most coercive measures are listed at the top, these range from outright force 
to different forms of restrictions or punitive pressures.  
 Sanctions and other pressures – these are less coercive, and are based on the logic of 
reward and punishment, encouraging change through positive incentives, and/or 
increasing the cost of intransigence. They can be threatened or applied, and include a 
range of activities from formal sanctions to symbolic penalties.  
 Incentives and rewards for cooperation – these are again less coercive measures, 
and are based on the logic of encouraging or persuading through the use of rewards and 
incentives for compliance. They aim to foster favourable conditions for engagement, 
encourage progress in a peace process, support the implementation of peace 
agreements, and generate wider support for peace. These incentives can be economic 
(peace conditionalities), political and/or security related. 
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 Facilitation – these are non-coercive measures that support the conflict parties’ 
negotiations. They encourage changes in relationships and mindsets, they build capacity 
to negotiate, facilitate dialogue and provide forums, training, and tools.  
Figure 1: A spectrum of influence (Source: Griffiths & Barnes, 2008, p.13; emphasis/colour 
added. Reproduced with kind permission from Conciliation Resources) 
 
 
 Examples of instruments  
 
Most 
coercive 
↑ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Force 
change 
Military intervention  
• Unilateral military intervention  
• Non-consensual deployment of peacekeeping forces 
 
Pressure for 
change 
through 
punishments 
and threats 
against non-
cooperation 
Formal sanctions  
• Economic sanctions: e.g. comprehensive trade embargoes, 
selective trade embargoes (especially on the commodities essential 
to war economies such as diamonds or timber)  
• Arms embargoes (on arms supply, training, military cooperation 
etc)  
• Targeted financial or diplomatic sanctions such as asset freezes, 
travel and visa bans  
• Proscription (i.e. outlawing and blacklisting) of individuals and 
organisations  
 
Other forms of pressure  
• Non-centralised diplomatic and political sanctions, such as 
suspending diplomatic relationships (e.g. recalling / expelling 
diplomats or representatives), withdrawing recognition  
• Cutting off valued support and resources, suspension of trade 
preferences or development aid  
• Sports or cultural boycotts  
• Referral to international criminal courts on war crimes 
investigations  
• Condemnatory statements or ‘internationalising’ issues (e.g. by 
putting situations on intergovernmental agendas) 
 
Encourage 
change 
through 
rewards for 
cooperation 
and 
progress 
Economic and institutional benefits  
• Reconstruction or development aid  
• Debt relief  
• Favourable trade-related or financial measures (tariff reductions, 
direct purchases, most-favoured nation status, extending subsidies 
to exports or imports, providing export or import licenses, 
guaranteeing investments, encouraging capital imports or exports, 
etc)  
• Support for institutional, political and judicial reforms (e.g. training 
of public officials, decentralisation of power, political party-building)  
• Election reform, support and monitoring (often part of a package of 
political guarantees)  
• Human rights promotion, monitoring and institution-building  
• Security sector reform  
 
Engagement, legitimisation and recognition benefits  
• Diplomatic recognition, official visits or receiving representatives 
(including normalising relations / ending isolation)  
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Least 
coercive 
• Access to international organisations (membership, association, 
favourable status) 
 
Encourage 
change 
through 
resources 
and 
guarantees 
to support 
engagement 
Resources for enabling dialogue  
• Material or technical assistance for confidence-building and for 
dialogue and negotiation processes (e.g. hosting conferences and 
dialogue processes)  
• Material or technical assistance to help settle key issues (e.g. 
support for land reform, reforms of armed forces)  
 
Assurances and guarantees  
• Security guarantees (e.g. monitoring and peacekeeping)  
• Assistance with demilitarisation and security sector reform (e.g. 
demobilisation and reintegration of armed forces, professionalisation 
of armed and other security forces, compensation schemes)  
• Political guarantees (commitments to support implementation of 
substantive agreements)  
 
Enable 
change 
through 
facilitation 
Facilitation of dialogue  
• Ideas to settle key conflict issues or reframe the means of 
concessions  
• Capacity building for parties to engage in negotiations  
• Mediation / facilitation / problem-solving workshops 
 
3. Lessons 
Coordination/fragmentation of donors and agendas 
Conditionality is more likely to be effective if it is exercised coherently by donors, yet the 
fragmented donor landscape and donor incentive structures complicate this (Barnes, 
McKeon & Griffiths, 2008; Smith, 2008). However, the donor landscape is fragmented with 
numerous actors and agendas which may overlap or contradict each other, and often combine to 
“generate strategy gridlock” (Barnes, McKeon & Griffiths, 2008, p.7). Donors’ incentive structures 
and ideological approaches shape their organisational dynamics and interagency rivalries 
(Boyce, 2002). “These can undermine agency effectiveness even in pursuit of more familiar 
development objectives, let alone in responding to the novel challenges of building peace” 
(Boyce, 2002). Examples of donor coordination arrangements include: contact groups, groups of 
friends, friends of a country, implementation and monitoring groups, and coordination 
mechanisms for assistance (Whitfield, 2008). 
Donors are often reluctant to coordinate and cooperate, preferring to pursue their own 
objectives, and preferring not to implement the agreed conditions if they contradict their 
objectives (Manning & Malbrough, 2010). Peace is often one objective among many for donors, 
e.g. alongside geopolitical aims, economic and commercial interests, and the repatriation of 
refugees (Boyce, 2002). These competing objectives tend to militate against the use and 
effectiveness of peace conditionality, e.g. by conditions not actually being enforced (Boyce, 
2002). E.g. while the US used peace conditionality to stop aid to the Palestinians under the 
Hamas government, it has not used it to stop or restrict aid to the Israelis, despite Israeli non-
compliance with the Oslo agreement, other various interim agreements, the Quartet Roadmap, 
and despite its continued expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank (Brynen, 
2008; Boyce 2002). Another example is the lack of enforcement of conditionalities following the 
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Sri Lanka 2003 conference: despite the context in Sri Lanka deteriorating, major donors (with a 
few exceptions) continued with their aid programmes (Smith, 2008). 
“Most aid and diplomatic actors (albeit not all) have been unwilling to seriously engage in 
a discussion of how their own interests could be reframed within a wider, more concerted 
approach, in which the carrots and sticks might be complementary and thus mutually reinforcing. 
The notion of strategic complementarity has occupied a marginal place in discussions about the 
role of international actors” (Smith, 2008, p.91). Smith (2008) concludes that for international 
actors to play a positive role, supporting peace must be at the core of their strategy; and that 
donors must analyse their responses to identify their explicit or implicit biases to ensure conflict 
sensitivity (Smith, 2008). 
When donors do not have a united stance on aid conditionality, the strength of 
conditionality is undermined (Boyce, 2002). E.g. it was impossible for donors to reach a 
coordinated position on their support to Sri Lanka, promised during the 2003 Tokyo Conference 
on Reconstruction and Development, with widely diverging support for peace conditionality, and 
on whether conditionalities should be negative, positive or structured as milestones to monitor 
progress (Smith, 2008, p.90). Smith (2008) identifies this ineffectiveness as resulting from: the 
wide variety of political and organisational agendas; the pressure on aid organisations to 
disburse committed funds regardless of conflict trends; and pressure from immigrant Sri Lankan 
constituencies in the donor countries in support of reconstruction; and the reluctance of donors to 
engage deeply in a country of modest strategic importance vis-à-vis other priorities (Smith, 
2008). Another example of lack of donor coordination undermining conditionality is the 
reconstruction of the Bosnian city Mostar’s electricity grid (Boyce, 2002). While the EU made its 
support to the reconstruction conditional on the electricity grid being shared between the 
Bosniacs and the Croats, before this was signed off, the World Bank agreed to repair the grid on 
just the Bosniac side, resulting in Mostar now having an electricity grid split between the two 
sides (Boyce, 2002, p.1028). 
Frerks (2006, p.32) summarises the major impediments to donor coordination for peace 
conditionality: 
 Multitude of actors 
 Transient actors 
 Costs in time and money 
 Need to satisfy own constituencies 
 Need to serve national interests 
 Donor competition 
 Unwillingness 
 Competing financing structures 
 Differing mandates, policies or specialisations 
 Differing timeframes 
 Differing ‘cultures’ 
 Differing assessments of the situation (root causes) and of feasibility of solutions  
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The conflict parties’ interests, power, and motivational structures  
Conditionality is more likely to be effective when it is responsive to the incentive 
structures of the conflict parties, the decision-making processes of the principal leaders, 
the interests, incentives and power of the NSAGs, and the wider socio-political context 
(Barnes, McKeon & Griffiths, 2008; Barnes & Griffiths, 2008; Dudouet & Galvanek, 2018). As 
Dudouet and Galvanek (2018) explain this includes not just knowledge of the NSAGs’ demands 
and/or political grievances, but “rather a much more in-depth understanding of the nature of the 
group and its sub-units, its specific and general interests, and the potential incentives that its 
members would respond to, specifically in terms of bringing them to or keeping them at the 
negotiation table”. Donors’ understanding of these incentive structures must be based on 
analysis of the context – of what the underlying causes are, and what is likely to modify the 
conflict’s course  (Smith, 2008). This analysis also needs to understand the full spectrum of 
conflict stakeholders – e.g. enemies, allies, affected parties, and disinterested others (Barnes, 
McKeon & Griffiths, 2008). The pros and cons of whether to impose strict fundraising regulations 
in ceasefire arrangements with NSAGs needs to be carefully weighed according to what is 
realistic and achievable for the NSAG (Dudouet & Galvanek, 2018). “Constructive ambiguity” in 
ceasefire provisions may allow for looser limitations on NSAG fundraising – e.g. with the 2015 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar (Dudouet & Galvanek, 2018). And ultimately 
conditionality only works if the aid recipient cares about the people that the aid will affect, e.g. in 
South Sudan conditionality is limited as, according to a diplomat quoted in a news article, “the 
South Sudanese authorities seem to feel immune to conditionality because they seem to think if 
you don't feed our people that's fine" (Oakford, 2017). 
However, donors’ lack of sufficient knowledge about the local context is “perhaps the 
greatest obstacle to the effective use of conditionality” (Manning & Malbrough, 2010). E.g. in 
Sri Lanka, key issues undermining the effectiveness of conditionality include the lack of donor 
understanding of the conflict causes, and how conditionality would impact on the political 
interests of the main protagonists (Smith, 2008). This resulted in the use of incentives and 
disincentives with little relevance – e.g. economic incentives mattered only in how they impacted 
on the core political interests of the conflict parties (Smith, 2008). 
The decision whether to include certain non-state armed groups (NSAG) in peace talks is 
complex as inclusion tends to bestow legitimacy on the NSAG. Podder (2013) suggests 
donors consider the following factors in deciding whether to include a NSAG: “the existence of 
political institutions, strong command and control over military forces, clear political vision, 
disciplined organizational structure, popular support, capacity to deliver basic services in the 
territory under their control, respect for the rule of law, and a leadership hierarchy that is strong, 
progressive, and able to offer a more positive governance experience as an alternative to weak 
and corrupt governments”. Podder (2013) also emphasises that despite the tendency to view all 
NSAGs as threats to security, spoilers, terrorists, and as negative for peace, it is important to 
“differentiate between armed groups in order to understand their potential for positive roles and 
partnership in state building by establishing the resources and support channels that constitute 
their socio-political legitimacy”. See the companion helpdesk query on NSAGs for more detail on 
this (Herbert, 2019). 
Donors cannot create a peace process, they can only support one where the key 
protagonists want one (Smith, 2008). There needs to be a more realistic understanding of the 
limits of international community engagement, in terms of what it can and cannot contribute, and 
key concerns around the appropriateness of interventions and sovereignty (Smith, 2008; Griffiths 
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& Barnes, 2008, p.19). External influence can play a key role in getting conflict parties to decide 
to engage with each other – e.g. in Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire (Barnes, McKeon & Griffiths, 2008). 
And conditionality appears to be most effective if it can help to shift the underlying conflict 
dynamics and build momentum towards a resolution (Barnes, McKeon & Griffiths, 2008). 
However, ultimately, “efforts to ‘buy peace’ rarely succeed because aid is seldom a pre-eminent 
factor in the transition from war to peace, operating at the margins of the political economy of 
war. The measures on offer may not be as attractive to the targets as anticipated. Incentives 
such as reconstruction and development assistance rarely trump political aspirations. The 
request to give up longheld values in exchange for an economic benefit can risk being 
interpreted as a bribe” (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008, p.19). 
Unintended consequences  
The use of peace conditionality is fraught with dilemmas and risks, particularly as groups 
or individuals may feign commitment just to secure benefits, or to meet international 
expectations (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). Griffiths and Barnes (2008) talk of a “dysfunctional 
over-incentivisation” to participate in peace talks when per diems are high, or when agreements 
include lucrative financial opportunities. External incentives can also negatively distort the 
motivations for peace-making (encouraging a process of bargaining for concessions from third 
parties), and they can trigger the fragmentation of armed groups (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). 
Effective conditionality requires donors to have a good understanding of the potential 
consequences of donor actions (intentional and unintentional), and the interlinkages 
between peacebuilding and other reform agendas (Ehrenfeld, et al., 2003; Manning & 
Malbrough, 2010). E.g. in Sri Lanka while donor reconstruction funds had aimed to incentive the 
north-east (and the rebel group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)) to come back into 
the mainstream, the funds were framed by Sinhalese nationalist groups as outsiders’ support for 
the LTTE, with an aim to split the country (Smith, 2008). Meanwhile, not all of the aid that was 
promised was delivered, fostering scepticism by LTTE hardliners about a negotiated settlement 
(Smith, 2008). 
The use of sanctions can lead to particularly adverse unintended consequences, as: they 
are rarely designed as part of a strategic conflict resolution framework; due to their 
bluntness and inflexibility; and due to perceptions of bias and inconsistency (Griffiths & 
Barnes, 2008). Case studies published in Conciliation Resources’ Accord publication found 
examples of sanctions that have inadvertently escalated conflict dynamics, while also not 
supporting behavioural change (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). E.g. terrorist listings “are typically 
perceived by the proscribed group as an attempt to de-legitimise their goals rather than their 
methods. This can sometimes entrench militant positions and weaken factions willing to explore 
a political strategy leading to conflict settlement by sealing off choices and avenues for dialogue” 
(Griffiths & Barnes, 2008). Griffiths and Barnes (2008) suggest that the effectiveness of sanctions 
as a tool of persuasion seems to depend on:  
“(a) how the leaders of the belligerent groups respond and whether they are concerned 
about the consequences of the sanctions on the public or themselves;  
(b) the credibility of the threatened sanctions and whether they will be implemented and 
enforced;  
11 
(c) the credibility of the sanctioners and particularly whether important allies will cut off 
their support; and  
(d) the wider political context and how it has shaped the expectations of the parties.”  
(In)effectiveness? 
There are diverse positions within the donor and academic community with regard to the 
desirability, feasibility, and effectiveness of conditionalities. While some believe that aid can 
be an effective incentive to negotiate and to reduce social tensions, particularly when tied to 
specific steps to build peace, others assert that aid alone cannot affect conflict dynamics or 
transform conflict. The effectiveness of aid as an incentive in a peace process also depends on 
the level of aid dependency of the country in question (Haider, 2014). Sindre (2014) emphasises 
there is limited analysis of the impacts of conditionality, particularly due to the “difficulty in 
identifying the processes that are actually affected by international aid and the specific kinds of 
outcomes that these processes produce”. 
Frerks (2006) highlights that ultimately that donors’ use of aid has a limited ability to 
change the dynamics of a conflict, and the aid package needs to be substantial enough 
(vis-à-vis other resources) to incentivise peace. Yet, “this is rarely the case, given long-term 
socially and culturally embedded differences between the parties involved, often exacerbated by 
a history of war compounded by mutual hate and fear. There is a strong and largely well-founded 
perception that peace cannot be imported or imposed, but must be made by the people 
concerned” (Frerks, 2006, p.31). Svensson (in Frerks, 2006) finds that on average aid does not 
seem to influence policy, which is at the core of how conditionality should work.  
Sindre (2014) finds that peace conditionalities may encourage peace talks, and ceasefires, 
and can encourage rebel strategies that enhance the civilian, non-military aspect of the 
insurgent organisation, but is a “poor tool” in reducing rebel predatory behaviour, and in 
encouraging peace settlements – this is based on a comparative analysis of the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) in Indonesia to the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). It was in Sri Lanka where 
conditionalities contributed to securing temporary ceasefires, but this aid did not have the 
expected transformative effects on the overall conflict dynamics (Sindre, 2014). It also found that 
“in the absence of a peace agreement that addresses the core political questions of the conflict, 
the use of aid conditionalities such as promoting joint collaborations in the administration of aid 
between protagonists to encourage conflict resolution heightens tensions while taking attention 
away from the core issues of the conflict” (Sindre, 2014). Conditionality did contribute to positive 
outcomes in post-settlement Indonesia, where the inclusion of rebels into the formal aid 
bureaucracy may have helped transform its militarist structures and strengthen its civilian 
capacities to become a politico-bureaucratic organisation. 
Barnes, et al. (2008) find that while, in theory, conditionality is thought to be useful in 
encouraging a peace settlement by increasing the cost-benefit equation of conflict and 
peace, in practice, it appears to have been ineffective, and even to have actually done 
harm in exacerbating conflict dynamics, as illustrated by case studies in the 2008 Accord 
publication (Barnes, McKeon & Griffiths, 2008, p.4). Ultimately, they find that unless the 
conditionality is applied coherently and strategically by external actors, the potential for leverage 
is blunt (Barnes, et al., 2008). Further, the usefulness of rational choices about costs and 
benefits is questionable as conflict causes are rooted in ideology and grievances, and the 
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complex interaction of conflict dynamics, both of which are not easily influenced by external 
pressures or incentives (Griffiths & Barnes, 2008, p.18-19).  
Conditionality affects different conflict parties in different ways – e.g. it is not very 
effective in influencing rebel groups that cannot directly receive aid (e.g. those classified 
as terrorists), whereas it can be influential when used with governments with high aid-
dependency (Boyce, 2003). In the latter case, conditionality can be beneficial to rebel groups 
(Boyce, 2003). Conditionality is more useful when aid flows/aid dependency are large so that aid 
can provide the donors leverage for encouraging peace (Brynen, 2008). However, Brynen (2006) 
notes that according to this logic, Palestine and Israel would present good cases for the use of 
conditionality, however in practice, conditionality there has not been enforced due to the donors’ 
political agendas.  
Inconsistencies and bias with conditionality can exacerbate conflict 
Peace conditionality in Palestine has contributed to the breakout of conflict, the 
undermining of the two-state roadmap to peace, and huge reductions in the living 
conditions of the Palestinians, finds Brynen (2008). Palestine has experienced peace 
conditionality in a variety of forms – “the ‘carrot’ of present or future aid has sometimes been 
used to entice parties into an agreement, or to cement elite or popular support for an agreement 
once it is signed. Conversely, the ‘stick’ of withdrawing or withholding aid has been used (less 
frequently) in an effort to punish, and ultimately change, behaviour” (Brynen, 2008, p.75). E.g. 
when Hamas won a majority in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council election, it won partial 
control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) from Fateh (Brynen, 2008). Yet Hamas’ political win 
meant that the PA lost most of its aid budget, as many donors had categorised Hamas as a 
terrorist organisation (e.g. the US, the EU, and Canada), and thus could not continue to fund the 
PA with Hamas at the helm (Brynen, 2008). Similarly, the taxes that the Israelis had collected on 
the PA’s behalf before were suspended (Brynen, 2008).  
Conditionality in Palestine has been used sporadically and inconsistently. E.g. It was not 
used much during the Oslo era (1993-2000) due to the lack of consensus on: donor 
responsibility, steps to advance peace, a unified donor position, and due to the reluctance to 
withhold aid for fear of weakening Fateh (Fateh being pro-negotiations), and due to reluctance to 
put pressure on Israel (Brynen, 2008).  
This changed dramatically in 2000/2001, as the conflict dynamics changed significantly 
with the 2000 failure of the Camp David Summit, the intifada (uprising), the unsuccessful Taba 
negotiation, and the election of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Israel and the US began to 
isolate and pressure the then President of the Palestinian National Authority Yasser Arafat to 
reform his constitutional powers, and to strengthen governance capacity and fiscal transparency 
(Brynen, 2008). New donor coordination mechanisms, and the Performance Based Roadmap to 
a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, set out the reform agenda, 
and donor pressure pushed through some reform successes. The plan was that these steps 
would “be followed by the establishment of a transitional ‘independent Palestinian state with 
provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty’ by December 2003, with subsequent 
permanent status negotiations leading to a final agreement and full statehood by the end of 
2005” (Brynen, 2008, p.76). However, increased violence and harsher Israeli restrictions (which 
led to a severe recession in the Palestinian territories and the creation of the separation wall and 
checkpoints) meant that aid had to move away from development programming towards 
emergency humanitarian programming, and grievances spiralled (Brynen, 2008). Moreover,  no 
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real progress was made on the Roadmap or the establishing of a Palestinian State (Brynen, 
2008). 
Aid conditionality was used again after 2004 with Arafat’s death, as US$3 billion per year was 
promised to the West Bank and Gaza. Yet the “focus on aid came at the expense of a focus on 
the real political issues at the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”, e.g. while aid was delivered, 
donors did not pressure the Israeli government to reduce its restrictions on trade and movement, 
the latter being much more significant for Palestine’s development and conflict dynamics 
(Brynen, 2008, p.77). The focus on providing aid was easier politically than diplomacy efforts to 
address the causes of the conflict (Brynen, 2008). Few of the obligations in the Roadmap were 
met, and the target dates were passed and forgotten (Brynen, 2008). 
Ethical considerations 
Conditionality poses serious dilemmas related to ethics, neo-colonialism, and sovereignty 
(Ehrenfeld, et al., 2003; Boyce, 2002). These include the morality of withholding aid from 
communities in need during humanitarian and conflict crises and conditionality as blackmail or 
coercion in furthering the political objectives and ideologies of donors. Ultimately, as “conflict and 
peace is extremely political and normative”, donors need to assess the appropriateness and 
ethics of interfering in the political struggles of other communities and countries (Frerks, 2006, 
p.31).  
Yet, as Goodhand and Sedra (2007, p.43) point out, “aid has political impacts whether 
there are strings attached or not. Therefore, donors, by providing aid unconditionally, do not 
render themselves politically neutral”. Issues of power relations, the asymmetries of power, 
information, ideologies and preferences are central to study and use of conditionality (Goodhand 
& Sedra, 2007). 
Post-conditionality approach 
“In development circles conditionalities have increasingly fallen out of favour. There has been a 
shift away from notions of ‘hard’ conditionalities towards ideas of streamlining or selectivity. 
Some donors such as the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) are said to 
have adopted a ‘post-conditionality’ approach, which emphasises policy dialogue and 
‘ownership’, alignment and harmonisation. While a ‘post-conditionality’ position may be tenable in 
a stable context where there is ‘incentive compatibility’, it is unclear whether or how this can be 
translated into a realistic policy in conflictual settings. Meaningful policy dialogue and domestic 
ownership may not be possible where the state is fractured, and unconditional aid runs the risk of 
fuelling conflict” (Goodhand & Sedra, 2007, p.42-43; Boyce, 2004). 
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